BOTSWANA

Politics and Society



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THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN BOTSWANA by Jeff Ramsay

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Introduction

In 1960 the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP) emerged as Botswana's first mass-based political party, having been preceded by a variety of localized, elitist, and/or externally based organizations. In its early months, the BPP made rapid progress in mobilizing support along the eastern line of rail. In its pioneering freedom squares, it called for immediate independence, while attacking racism and royal privilege. But the party ultimately failed to attract significant support in most of the rural reserves. Compromised by internal power struggles of its own making, after 1962 the BPP was eclipsed by the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), which began as a coalition of educated local notables. Although generally more moderate in its rhetoric than its BPP counterparts, leading members of the BDP were equally determined to transfer power from the chiefs and colonialists to a centralized national democratic government. The BDP's 1965 landslide victory in Botswana's first one-person-one-vote election established an electoral pattern that would survive for another quarter century.

The Federal and Congress Parties

The first significant attempt to form a Protectorate-wide political party occurred in April 1959 when Raditladi launched the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party (BPFP). (1) But, like earlier Raditladi initiatives the movement proved to be no more than a flash in the pan. Its emergence was connected with Raditladi's desire to influence the outcome of the ongoing talks about the composition of Legco, which he rightfully believed would be dominated by the JAC coalition of whites and chiefs, and a desire to stem the re-emergence of his old nemesis Tshekedi as the dominant political player in Gammangwato.

The BPFP immediately attracted the support of an impressive line-up of political activists, including Motsete, Matante, L. Seretse, Gaolese Koma, and Archelaus Tsoebebe, the veteran founder of both the Bechuanaland Protectorate African Teachers and Civil Servants Associations, as well as local scholars M.L.A. Kgasa and Benjamin Thema. Various Protectorate

Batswana groups in South Africa also expressed interest in the party. As the British, themselves, appreciated the time was ripe for nationalist politics, what was lacking was a leader. (2) Unfortunately for the BPFP Raditladi once more proved himself to be not up to the task of organization building. In November 1959 he all but turned his back on the movement by taking up the position of Subordinate African Authority for Mahalapye.

As the BPFP faded there was a brief flurry of interest in attempts to form other parties. The initiative that received the most official attention in 1959-60 was Bechuanaland Congress Party (BCP). (3) By this time "Congress" had become something of a generic term for nationalist activities. For its part, the BCP functioned as a youth-oriented militant organization. At the time there was a growing ferment among secondary students who, excited by outside events, began to react against racial paternalism, most notably through the 1960 St. Joseph's College strike. The BCP sought to openly ally itself with the Bechuanaland Protectorate Students Association, led by such British-perceived radicals as David Magang and Peter Maruping. But, like the BPFP, the BCP lacked a leader. Its most dynamic member, Kenneth Koma, was studying in Prague, where he ended up settling for some time, marrying a Czech Jane Voegolova, while regularly forwarding Communist literature to potential recruits back home. (4) From there instead of returning he went to Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, where he stayed until 1965, completing a doctoral study on the Congo Crisis. With the emergence of the BPP, both the BPFP and BCP became irrelevant.

The Emergence of the BPP and BDP

Credit for the BPP's launch largely belongs to Mpho. Deported from South Africa in June 1960, he took the lead in drafting the party's constitution, which was finalized in December 1960. (5) The ineffectual but reassuring Motsete became the party's first President with Mpho managing organizational details as Secretary-General. In February 1961 Motsete recruited Matante as Vice President. (6) Other early recruits included many veterans from domestic and regional struggles whose collective experience was of immediate benefit to the party. In the months that followed the BPP went from strength to strength with its aggressive call for national self-determination and an end to white racism. Its early public meetings, the first local Freedom Squares, incorporated songs, often composed for the occasion, and speeches by female as well as male audience members from all walks of life. From the beginning, the British administration watched the Party's progress with anxiety. By April 1961 the Resident Commissioner, Peter Fawcus, reported to his superiors that:

"An extremist African nationalist party called People's Party has established itself in the Northern Protectorate and has gained a considerable following in Bamangwato and Francistown area. It is working strenuously and with some success to extend itself throughout the Protectorate."(7)

From the beginning, its leaders' contacts assured that outside interest in the BPP was not confined to nervous colonial administrators. In March 1961 the British, under "peculiar circumstances", intercepted a letter to Motsete from the Ghanaian-based Bureau of African Affairs. (8) Noting that "you are already intimately aware of our support for your noble cause" the Bureau invited the BPP to participate in the Cairo All African States Conference. Although this letter was never delivered, with Joshua Nkomo's assistance Mpho did set out for Egypt, only to be turned back by the British at Nairobi and subsequently detained for a few days by Southern Rhodesian police. (9) Despite this setback, in June 1961 Matante and Mpho made the first of several trips to Accra, where they obtained financial support. (10) By February 1962 the Bureau had donated at least L 5,000 to the BPP, allowing the Party to purchase three Land Rovers, as well as meet other expenses. This money was channelled through Matante's personal account in Francistown via Dar-es-Salaam.

Inside Botswana, the BPP's expansion beyond the rail towns into the rural reserves was most Batswana lived was compromised by the opposition of royalists alarmed at the stridency of the party's initial anti-chief rhetoric. More critically the party also ultimately failed in its overtures to local reformists like Masire, Nwako, L. Seretse, and Tsoebebe, all of whom had been alienated from the party by April 1961. In that month the BPP made a strategic blunder by its decision to boycott elections for the Africa Council, which was to serve as an electoral college for the new Legco, whose equal representation of whites and blacks was unacceptable to the party. Perhaps drawing the wrong lessons from the earlier history of the Federation, the BPP leaders were not won over by Fawcus' January 1961 assurance to them that the Legco's "communal representation" was simply the first stage in a transition towards greater democracy. (11) As it was the Africa Council elections proved to be a political watershed, bringing to office dozens of leading reformists of the Malekantwa/Maganamokwa generation, most of whom would ultimately find a home in the BDP. Motsete who had run in Gammangwato in apparent contradiction to party policy was defeated.

By then the party had also lost the support of Gammangwato's uncrowned leader, Seretse Khama. At its inception, the BPP, like the BPFP before it, apparently hoped that Seretse would be content with a figurehead role above politics. Indeed, at the BPP's inaugural rallies in Letswapong, there were banners proclaiming Seretse as Bechuanaland's future leader. (12) Earlier, in September 1959, Mpho had recognized Seretse's ultimate importance. In a letter to Seretse, Mpho in the guise of secretary of a newly formed "Protectorate Batswana National Association" expressed his condolences for Tshekedi's death, adding:

“We ask Sir you step into his boots right now and carry on with the plans you had together, those of developing the Protectorate. Be comforted. You are not alone; the whole Protectorate is with you. Bechuanaland is no more divided, it is one. Hence we have formed this association to prove our unity."(13)

The assumption by Mpho and others in 1960-61 that Seretse would be willing to accept a titular role was undoubtedly encouraged by Seretse's seeming indifference to politics at the time. In this, they probably misjudged ill health and a transient sense of complacency for a lack of interest if not ambition. Seretse was unsure of which direction to move. For his part Mpho failed to appreciate the fact that Seretse, upon his return from exile in 1956, had decisively turned his back on traditional claims to *bogosi jwa Bangwato*, opening the door for his emergence as a nationalist leader in his own right. In this Mpho's long stay in South Africa and lack of roots in Gammangwato seems to have made him woefully insensitive. Seretse's initial expression of interest in the BPP was put off by Mpho's insistence that he keep himself above politics. (14)

The Africa Council and Legco, which began meeting in May-June 1961, proved to be ideal forums for the coalescing of key activists unaffiliated with the BPP around the leadership of Seretse. For his part Fawcus considered Seretse and Masire to be the councils' outstanding members and he was thus delighted to see the two of them working well together. (15) Privately he confided to Seretse that having Masire as a partner was the key to building a national movement. Masire, himself, recalls:

"Between Seretse and I, it was love at first sight. We clicked the first day we met [at Legco]. He must have heard about me from someone."(16)

By 1961 Fawcus was eager that Seretse to play the role of the leading nationalist. In August 1961 he found an external ally in the visiting American Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Mennon Williams, for

whom Fawcus arranged a stopover at Serowe to have an audience with Seretse and other “prominent Bechuana”.(17) Williams urged Seretse to end his hesitation, in his subsequent report noting:

"The British have moved slowly in Bechuanaland. They actually are not quite sure what to do with the territory, but they have at least developed a good relationship with Seretse Khama, the chief nationalist leader...Of all the places I visited I felt the least urgency in Bechuanaland. Its slow but steady progress from tribalism to a legislative council-type government seems satisfactory to all and we should do nothing to disturb it."(18)

Seretse finally made his move in October 1961 at a four-day debate at the Serowe lekgotla, held to decide whether the BPP should be banned with the Gammangwato. (19) Conservative elements in the area were opposed to the activities of all political parties, which threatened to undermine the traditional order. But many younger educated men favoured freedom of association and assembly as part of a process of curbing the powers of Chiefs and moving toward democratic government. Seretse waited until the last day. His speech as minuted read:

"Mr. Seretse Khama agreed that the People's Party was confusing the people and was out to cause dissension between the tribe, Government, and white inhabitants of the Territory. He said that the only way to fight the Party was for those who stood for the chieftainship and for peaceful co-existence with the white people was to form themselves into a body that would expose the falsehoods put out by the People's Party and which would be instrumental in persuading Government to bring about changes in the administration of the Territory that might be desirable. At present, the tribe had no organization to fight the Party and was doing nothing to stop them. The people should unite and form an organization with proper leaders which would be a power in the land and which would be able not only to stop the damage being caused by the People's Party but which would be able to advise Government on what should be done to further the interests of the Territory."(20)

Members of the Ngwato Tribal Executive Committee, including Goareng Mosinyi, Nwako, G.G. Sebeso, and Seretse, himself, were the core of the envisaged party. A month later at the second Legco meeting in Lobatse Seretse called a caucus of all the African members of the Council. There he put forward his ideas for a “Bechuanaland National Democratic Party.” Chiefs Bathoen and Mokgosi (of Balete) immediately disassociated themselves from the proposal, maintaining that as royals they were expected to remain above party politics. But the others present signed on.

Among them was Masire, who had apparently been approached earlier by Seretse through his old schoolmate Nwako. He, along with Seretse, and Tsoebebe, were charged with drafting a constitution for the party, to be presented to a follow-up meeting at Mahalapye in January 1962. (21)

When word reached Mpho about the preparations for a new party he called up Seretse to suggest that, as a chief, he should remain above politics, hinting that he could perhaps become the titular head of state in a BPP government. (22) Unimpressed Seretse reportedly responded: "What you want is to grab the people for yourself". Taking up a theme that he would never quite let go Mpho then communicated to the radical ANC-aligned newspaper "New Age" that the "chiefs and whites in the Territory" were holding behind-the-scenes talks for the formation of their own party. (23) Seretse was equally firm in dismissing similar arguments put forward by more conservative elements around Raditladi who had half-heartedly floated the idea of reviving the Federal Party with Seretse at its head. (24)

At Mahalapye the constitution was approved after minor amendments. Ex-serviceman, educator, and veteran BakaNswazwi activist Amos Dambe convinced everyone to drop the "National" from the party name. (25) A month later the party held its inaugural public meeting at Gaborone under a morula tree not far from the modern-day Orapa House. This venue had been hastily chosen after permission was withdrawn for them to meet at Mochudi, where they had already assembled. The Bakgatla regent, Mmusi, had come under pressure from his conservative councillors, and neighbouring chiefs. Under the morula tree, the Party elected its officers with the top three positions going to Seretse, President; Tsoebebe, Vice-President; Masire, Secretary and Benjamin Steinberg, a wealthy white trader, and rancher, Treasurer.

The aborted Mochudi meeting served to underscore the distance that existed between the nascent party and the southern royals. In this respect, although Seretse was never shy to play the royal card in Gammangwato and Gatawana, where he installed Letsholathebe II in December 1964, the Domkrag was never a "chiefs party" in its convictions. Both philosophically and personally Seretse shared with such figures as Masire and Nwako a strong desire to break the residual power of such rulers Bathoen and Kgari as a step toward a new, democratically legitimised, dispensation.

During the BDP's first months, Seretse did meet with several chiefs, including Bathoen and Kgari, in Molepolole apparently not so much to attract their blessing as to discourage their active opposition. (26) The

host, Kgari, however, remained publicly opposed (though privately resigned) to all political parties. By one account Seretse was moved to openly condemn Kgari's autocracy. As it was Kgari, having repeatedly declared that chieftainship would be buried with him, died a few months later without a clear successor. Seretse's appeal may have had a greater effect on Bathoen who in a 1962 *pitso* (public assembly) stated as far as political parties were concerned "I do not pay attention to these organizations."(27) According to Masire after the election:

"Bathoen felt betrayed when Seretse became openly democratic [in curbing the local prerogatives of chiefs]. Not that he had ever been promised anything, but he had come to the wrong conclusions."(28)

Notwithstanding its ultimate success, the BDP's triumph looked far from certain at the time of its birth. Outside of Gammangwato, where Seretse Khama's standing assured a solid base of initial support, it was largely through Masire's tireless grassroots organizing, initially as the party's southern, later nationwide coordinator, that the BDP was transformed from an elite network into a genuinely national movement. In the early months of 1962, Masire was confronted with the fact that the BPP had a considerable head start in both recruiting and fundraising. In Francistown and Lobatse large crowds were still being drawn to the Freedom Squares. Initial BDP crowds were generally smaller. At one such early meeting in Francistown, Matante taunted the BDP saying:

"Ke bale Madomkraga, ba re ba dire phutego, mme ba naene o ka re ba ja legapu!" ("Look at the BDP meeting of nine people, they are like a group gathered to eat a melon!")(29)

Unlike the BPP, which by 1962 was still concentrating its efforts along the line of rail, Masire and his partners immediately set about recruiting activists in all of the country's regions and villages. He started by sitting down "to write letters to anyone I could think of," and often such people were those he had known as the editor of *Naledi ya Batswana*. Others were teachers, progressive farmers, and old Tiger Kloof acquaintances. Masire also drew up and distributed a statement of the party's principles, entitled "*Maitlomo le Maikaelelo*" ("Intentions and Purposes").

There were also personal approaches. One then prospective member recalls being approached by Masire and Nwako in 1962 with a 2-point: 1) the BDP would end tribal divisions uniting the country under Seretse and 2) it would curb the powers of the Chiefs regarding such issues as land allocation. (30) Nuts and bolts organizing of this sort paid off for BDP

attracted an ever-widening network of younger educated men. These activists were generally not supporters of the BPP but saw the need for party politics to replace chieftainship as the basis for future politics.

In the absence of revealing documents sources of external support for the BDP in the early sixties are even more difficult to trace than those of the BPP. Leading colonial officials were acutely aware that any direct British support for the party would undermine its nationalist credentials, which were from the beginning challenged in Pan-African quarters by the BPP. They may, however, have introduced Seretse to the Ariel Foundation, which was originally established by the British trade union movement to assist colonial trade unions, but which later extended itself to supporting political parties as well. The Foundation is alleged to have been a conduit by which secret U.K. funds were channelled to the BDP. (31) In general the BPP had pre-empted Pan-African solidarity support, though Mpho alleges that Nkrumah ultimately gave Tsoebebe L 10,000 to woe the BDP away from the British. (32)

The BPP Split

At the time of the BDP's emergence, the BPP with its external support, head start, committed militants, and populist appeal, remained a credible contender for national leadership. But the Party's future hopes were already being undermined by infighting. A virtual absence of financial control and oversight contributed to this breakdown, with the channelling of large sums of money through the private bank accounts of Matante, and possibly others, inevitably giving rise to allegations of misappropriation. Questions over financial management soon became intertwined with those of power. Thus, when Mpho called for the establishment of a central BPP headquarters at his then home base of Palapye, which would coordinate finances, his proposal was looked upon as a power grab by both Matante, in Francistown, and Motsete, at Lobatse. (33)

By June 1962 dissension had surfaced in the South African press over the local leadership and allocation of party resources at Lobatse, where Motsete seems to have been more respected than followed by the rank-in-file. (34) The situation in Lobatse, and Francistown, was especially complicated by the participation of political refugees from South Africa and elsewhere in party affairs. The open existence, until 1963, of BPP branches among Batswana migrant workers inside South Africa at a time when the ANC and PAC had already been driven underground, further tied the party to external forces: before the split, perhaps one-third of the

party's membership was based in South Africa. The early 1962 break-up of the South African United Front, an umbrella alliance between the exiled wings of the ANC and PAC, may have thus provided a context, if not cause, for the growth of tensions within the BPP.

On June 20, 1962, Mpho forwarded the following letter to the Secretary of the Lobatse branch, Moses Monakwe, which was copied to all other members of the BPP National Executive:

"Dear Son of Africa, Your branch is informed that the National Executive has agreed to come and investigate your branch's organizational difficulties on the 28th of June, 1962 in the evening including the 29th of June, 1962 if the investigation will not be finished on the night of the 28th June. Hoping that the branch will continue to do its day-to-day branch work. Yours in the struggle for Independence and a free united Africa."(35)

But when Mpho finally arrived at Lobatse, on the 29th of June, he found that Monakwe, along with the branch Chairman, Fish Keitseng, and Treasurer, James Molale, had already been told that they were suspended by Matante, who had arrived on the 27th at Motsete's request. (36)

Also, on the 27th Matante, accompanied by five others and with the knowledge of Motsete, is alleged to have briefly abducted an ANC refugee named Maxwell Mlonyeni, who was then active in the Lobatse branch's affairs. (37) According to Mlonyeni's sworn police statement, he was initially tricked into accompanying Matante with a story that an acquaintance of his had died. He was then driven from his workplace, at Otsi's Bamalete Manganese Mine, to the Zeerust border crossing. There Matante is further alleged to have made sure that he signed the departure register while informing the policeman on duty that the refugee was being deported with the knowledge of the District Commissioner. After crossing without incident into South Africa, Mlonyeni managed to re-enter the Protectorate, by bypassing the border gate and making his way to Peleng township. On the following day, he filed a police complaint against Matante.

There were thus already considerable grounds for acrimony on Friday evening, the 29th, when Mpho, himself, was approached by Matante, who had just ferried down more supporters from Francistown. (38) Matante now demanded that Mpho turn over the keys to the party Land Rover in his charge, but the Secretary-General refused, reportedly sparking "considerable argument that continued on to the following day."

On Saturday morning Matante and Motsete tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Mpho from joining them in attending a scheduled rally at Kanye. The three then set out with their followers, each in their respective party Land Rover, to the capital of the Bangwaketse. There, in contrast to the polite reception that the BPP had received on previous occasions, they were continuously heckled "as a bunch of tsotsis" and bribe-takers by a hostile crowd of some 700. That evening, Matante saw Mlonyeni in the street at Lobatse and publicly abused him, warning that he would be dealt with for having come back after being thrown out of the territory. But no further action took place at that time. Everything was set for a Sunday morning showdown.

The showdown came shortly after sunrise, when some of Matante's partisans briefly toured Peleng in their Land Rover, calling on its residents to attend a morning rally. (39) Upon hearing this announcement Mpho, who was staying with the already suspended Lobatse Chairman, Keitseng, dispatched one of his supporters, Patrick Tshane, to drive around the location in his Land Rover, informing the public that the rally would be held in the afternoon instead of the morning. Using a loudspeaker, Tshane is reported to have further said:

“We cannot tolerate to be led by Matante who takes our children during the night and throws them across the border. B.P.P. is non-violent and we don't want a Hitler with his dictatorship to use our party for his guilty ends. This party is not his but for you the people.”(40)

Some of Matante's men responded by chasing after Tshane in their vehicle. The two Land Rovers finally came to a halt outside of the Lobatse Garage, where a minor scuffle broke out over the keys to the Palapye car. By the time Trooper Mophuting, a Motswana policeman who had been observing the confrontation as a Special Branch Operator, intervened a crowd of about 100 had begun exchanging blows, with others pouring in. Fearing a riot Mophuting told the gathering to disperse within ten minutes or face “trouble”. He also advised Mpho, whose supporters were outnumbered, to surrender his vehicle's keys to Matante. Both sides accepted this intervention. Along with another constable, Mophuting then accompanied Matante, Mpho, Keitseng, Tshane, and a few others to Motsete's Peleng home.

Upon their arrival, Motsete, in the presence of the police, informed the assembly that: "As the President of this Party I have the right to take some

measures when a situation like this demands, thus why I am handing this letter to Mpho.” The letter, which he drafted on the spot, read:

“It pains me to inform you that due to what the Investigating Committee has discovered to be the activities of sabotage against the leadership of the Party of which it is apparent that you are connected, I should take this measure of suspending you. Your suspension starts today and you are required to hand to Matante all Party property e.g., Land Rover, correspondence, typewriters, and badges."(41)

Mpho reluctantly accepted Motsete's letter while protesting that the procedure was improper. Matante publicly announced the Presidential decree later in the afternoon:

"The General Secretary, Motsamai Mpho, was suspended from the Party as from today for trying to start destruction and sow the seeds of public violence which is unconstitutional. Most of the refugees from South Africa are responsible for encouraging the present bad spirit. We should keep our eyes on them for they bring with them from South Africa a spirit we do not want in Bechuanaland. These refugees must be warned that while they are in Bechuanaland they should stay out of politics and matters that do not concern them. If they continue to interfere, then I myself, Philip Matante will take them outside our boundaries. I will drive them out because I have seen that they are bringing Communism and A.N.C. ideas to this country. If they start practicing communism they are playing with fire. I personally will deal with them without consulting any policeman or District Commissioner."(42)

Before leaving for Palapye on the evening train, Mpho counterattacked by joining with four other members of the BPP National Executive- Keitseng, J.G. Lesetedi (Treasurer), Klaas Motshidisi, and M.M. Tlale, in drawing up a motion of no confidence in Matante and Motsete. (98) In it they denounced the "act of terrorism and threats" against members of the Lobatse Branch undertaken by "Mr. Matante and his Francistown army of our oppressed young men who have acted without thinking." At the time the Executive had a total of eight members, also including Matante, Motsete, and M.O Mpe (who was not then in Lobatse but subsequently associated himself with the Mpho faction), meaning that its majority had rejected the legitimacy of the purge carried out without their consent. On this basis, the suspended members refused to hand over any books and other Party belongings in their possession to Matante as directed by Motsete.

On August 1, the five aggrieved Executive members took the additional step of filing a legal application against Matante (Motsete had then left for Ghana), ordering him to turn over all Party property in his possession pending the outcome of further civil proceedings to be instituted alleging his misappropriation of external donations. (43) This action had the practical effect of resulting in the court's temporary impoundment of the three Land Rovers.

While the pro-Mpho Executive majority attempted to retake control of the party through ultimately futile legal action, both parties waged a more important struggle for support within the branches. In the split's immediate aftermath, the Mpho faction was supported by the Mahalapye, Palapye, and Shoshong leaderships, while Francistown and Mochudi rallied behind Matante and Motsete. (44) Most of the twenty other then-established branches, including those in South Africa, progressed from calls for unity to bitter internal divisions between the proponents of what quickly became two rival movements, each calling itself the true BPP. In a number of the Tribal Reserves, including Gammangwato, fears about the potential for violent inter-factional confrontation were invoked to justify the temporary banning of public rallies by the Party. (45)

Throughout 1962 the Matante-Motsete grouping continued to justify their purge based on a supposed need to free the Party from unwelcome Communist-ANC influence. As one prominent supporter told a Peleng audience:

"I was once a member of the Communist Party in South Africa from 1942 to 1947 but no longer. I am now a member of the B.P. Party and I know that Fish and his men are trying to organize the Communist Party here and take their orders from the ANC who are directed by communists...If these refugees continue to interfere in B.P. Party affairs they will be put on the Land Rovers and taken across the border. We shall phone the S.A.P. Zeerust to meet them on the way."(46)

For his part, Mpho to this day denies any direct link between his faction and the ANC, maintaining that he stopped working for the movement after his deportation. (47) This contention is consistent with B.P. Special Branch analysis at the time, which was dismissive of the argument that Motsete and Matante had launched a pre-emptive strike against an ANC takeover: "There is absolutely no evidence to link Mpho with the Lobatsi dissidents nor is there any evidence that he was attempting to form an A.N.C. splinter group financed from the Republic."(48) Instead they perceived the influence of the PAC: "It would appear therefore that

Matante and Motsete were under instructions from their P.A.C. bosses in Ghana to rid the party of all A.N.C. elements. Their instruction has been ruthlessly carried out and it remains to be seen whether Matante is strong enough to stave off the mud now being thrown at him."(49)

There is, however, no public proof that the PAC played such a central role. Indeed, the only confirmed contribution by the PAC to the BPP, prior to the break-up, was a relatively modest £ 200, which was entrusted to Matante by the PAC's London representative, Nana Mahomo, for the maintenance of refugees in Francistown. (50) Between June and August 1962 the PAC was, furthermore, preoccupied with the reorganization of its underground activities under the leadership of Potlake Leballo.

The influence of both the ANC and PAC in the BPP split has perhaps been exaggerated until now when it has become an alibi for overlooking the ambitions and vulnerabilities of local politicians. In this respect, one does not believe that the PAC would have condoned Motsete's contacts with the South African Police (SAP). On August 10, 1962, the BPP President wrote to the SAP in Johannesburg, Mafeking, Rustenburg, and Zeerust, informing them that a Party rally was to be held in Lobatse from the 17-19th August. (51) He further stated that ANC members might attempt to cross over from South Africa to attend. In response to this information, the SAP mounted an intensive surveillance of the border and began to search all Protectorate-bound rail traffic.

The meeting referred to by Motsete had been called for in late July by the pro-Mpho Executive in an attempt to re-establish their authority. (52) All branches were invited to send delegates to a one-day meeting on August 19th to elect a new National Executive. In response Peter Maruping, who had been appointed by Motsete as acting Secretary-General, in Mpho's place, sent out a counter-letter to the branches on August 2nd, also inviting them to come to Lobatse on the 19th for a mass demonstration. Matante's hearing on charges of abducting Mlonyeni was then scheduled for the 20th. (53)

Within the colonial administration, there was a fear that serious clashes might occur when the rival BPP factions gathered. This concern was further justified on the 16th when Jacob Lesabeer and two other pro-Mpho Francistowners reported to the police "that 7 members of the B.P.P. Youth League had threatened them that if they attended the Mpho meeting in Lobatsi on the 19th August, they would be killed and their property burned."(54) The seven were taken into custody and eventually fined. Their hearing sparked off a small riot, on the 22nd when police fired

teargas to disperse a predominately female crowd of some 200 Matante supporters who reportedly attempted to storm the Francistown courthouse; 38 were arrested. As a result of such tensions, the police implemented a security operation of surveillance and contingency controls at Lobatse, codenamed "Weekend Jaunt".

The break-up of the original BPP was formalized on Sunday, August 19, 1962, with the holding of rival meetings by the Mpho and Matante-Motsete factions at Lobatse. Between 9.20 am and 1.45 pm. eighty pro-Mpho, "delegates" and a fluctuating number of additional supporters crowded into the local beer hall to elect a new President (Mpho), National Executive (with Mpho's brother-in-law Jitiro Macheng as Secretary-General), and branch leaders. The resulting organization continued to call itself the BPP until 1964 when it reconstituted itself as the Botswana Independence Party. (55) Among those whose beer hall attendance attracted official attention was another Mpho in-law, the Wayeyi separatist Chombo Saundo, whose 1961 civil disobedience campaign against the Batawana Tribal Administration had been crushed by the British. The gathering, nonetheless, reaffirmed itself as: “The leadership that shall not help the Imperialists and Colonialists to continue to divide the already divided Africa.” (56)

Across town, a larger gathering of Matante-Motsete supporters at the Freedom Square overshadowed the launching of the "BPP-Mpho". This meeting was ostensibly held to canvass opinion against the Protectorate's "so-called Land Tenure System", in preparation for Matante's scheduled September 10th appearance before the United Nations Committee on Colonialism. (57) It also served as a show of strength and an opportunity to introduce Maruping and other newly appointed National Executive members to the branches.

Despite fears about the potential for clashes between the two groupings, the day passed without violent incidents. During the afternoon the Police Mobile Unit was deployed, but its presence proved unnecessary. Beyond any general appreciation of the day's tranquillity, the British were relieved that their worst fears about an open ANC presence had failed to materialize.

The “Pipeline”

Special Branch concerns that Mpho’s group might become too closely identified with the ANC were connected with a fear of exposing the "pipeline". The pipeline began as a covert operation between the British

Special Intelligence Service (MI6) and elements of the ANC, including the embryonic Umkonto we Sizwe (MK) to fly politically sensitive refugees out of the Protectorate to Tanganyika. The need for such an arrangement had become apparent in March-April 1960 when delays in arranging the passage of Oliver Tambo among others had risked South African intervention. Within the Protectorate, the "pipeline" was under the personal finance and control of Fawcus. Others known to be directly involved were Lobatse Police inspector John Sheppard, Kasane D.C. Brian Egner, Francistown D.C. Phil Steenkamp, a private pilot, H. Bartuane, and from the MK side Fish Keitseng (who kept the extent of his ANC activities secrete from his BPP colleagues). (58) Consistent with other evidence, Keitseng confirms that others members of the Special Branch were also involved.

By 1962 the pipeline was working in both directions allowing the MK commander, Nelson Mandela, to become the "black pimpernel" by slipping in and out of South Africa via Botswana. Mandela (using the codename David Motsamayi) last landed in the Protectorate, at Kanye, on July 23, 1962, where he and Keitseng were picked up by a Special Branch operator named Enos Kay. (59) Two weeks later Mandela was arrested at a Natal roadblock, the beginning of his long imprisonment. According to some recent accounts, he was betrayed by a Durban-based CIA agent. (60) The full truth remains a mystery.

Within days of Mandela's capture, the British were being challenged by the SAP about his passage through the territory. An August 15th minute notes: "I cannot help forming the opinion that the S.A.P. are aware of the fact that Mandela returned to the Republic via the B.P.", while an August 28th entry, following an SB conversation with an SAP sergeant, adds "It was as a result of information from contacts in Serowe, so he said, that they were eventually able to arrest Mandela."(61) The British considered the latter statement to be deliberate disinformation, but the "pipeline" was immediately closed down. Egner and Sheppard were hurriedly transferred out of the Protectorate to prevent their possible kidnapping. (62)

The British, thus, had grounds to worry about compromising publicity, as well as possible security breaches, resulting from the Matante-Motsete faction's anti-ANC campaign. This concern continued into October 1962, when Motsete led a high-profile placard demonstration against the ANC's convening of its critical first "underground" conference in exile at Lobatse, a gathering that was most notable for its formal endorsement of the armed struggle. (63) Motsete seems to have been finally warned off after he

raised the issue with the British of the presence of a Motswana civil servant, Lawrence Lekalake, at the conference. (64)

The Struggle for Supremacy

In 1963 the move toward independence began in earnest when Fawcus began multilateral consultations with representatives of all the political parties, the Chiefs, and the white settler community. Fawcus planned to introduce internal self-government, not through the Legislative Council, but through a new democratic constitution. During the talks Fawcus agreed to a fully elected, non-racial legislature, surprising many delegates. For the BDP negotiators, Masire, Nwako, and Seretse, the result was a triumph. They had kept their public statements moderate leading up to the conference trusting that the colonial regime would willingly support substantial reforms.

Only a few Europeans opposed these reforms. To drum up support they quickly formed a Tuli Block Democratic Party to advocate the retention of communal representation. (65) But, they were overruled and their movement faded. The "Fawcus Plan" changed the nature of the political struggle, placing Botswana's future in the hands of whichever nationalist politicians managed to win the upcoming election.

After an initial lull in activity, in 1964 the BDP launched a nationwide campaign to publicize both itself and the new dispensation. As part of this campaign, the party introduced a newspaper, *Therisanyo*, which was published on a monthly basis between 1964-67. The country's first non-government periodical, *Therisanyo* was edited and largely written by Masire, who today maintains that the paper aided the party in popularising its basic programme among the literate and its electoral symbol among the illiterate. (66)

The BDP national executive also devoted a great deal of energy to addressing meetings in all corners of the Protectorate. In a single month of February 1964, the Party held sixty rallies, even though eleven others were abandoned because Seretse was ill at the time. (67) Masire travelled over 5,000 kilometres between the 7th and the 23rd of that month across some of the remotest corners of the Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, and western Kweneng districts to address 24 inaugural meetings. In the process, he recruited future parliamentarians Eyes Rekoeng, Boy Moapare, and N.S. Sekga into the BDP fold. All three were elected in 1965 unopposed. It was also on this trip that Masire contacted David Keatlaretse of Maun, who went on to organize the BDP election campaign in Ngamiland where the

party won all three seats. (68) Meanwhile Dambe held twenty meetings in Bobirwa and Bukalanga, helping to consolidate the Domkrag in the rural northeast, while Tsoebebe held another 16 meetings in Kgatleng, eastern Kweneng, and southern Gammangwato.

While the BDP continued to gather strength, the BPP leaders continued fighting among themselves. Just after the conference, the Matante faction started to split again when longstanding tensions between Matante and Motsete came to the surface. The quarrel began over tactics. In the run-up to the constitutional conference, Matante had advocated a campaign of civil disorder, while Motsete wanted to steer a more moderate course. In November an incident in Francistown finally drove the two apart. (69) On the 12th a protest against a law licensing the brewing of traditional beer was staged inside the Tatitown beer hall and led primarily by shebeen women (who were also protesting against the Tati Company's monopoly of legal beer selling to Africans in the North-east). When the women refused to leave the police arrested forty-five, charging them with trespassing. On the following day members of the BPP Youth League in Francistown demonstrated outside the beer hall against the arrests. when the police arrived the youths hurled stones and several petrol bombs, which failed to ignite. The police responded with teargas and truncheons, arresting 103. Matante had not been involved but he now through his support behind the demonstrators, speaking out against police repression. Among township residents, he was the man of the hour.

Pushed aside Motsete tried to form a new alliance with Mpho, who was no longer willing to share power. With a few followers, Motsete claimed to lead yet a third faction of the BPP but by the time of the 1965 election he had faded into virtual insignificance.

In early 1964 the Government announced that the Protectorate's first one-person one-vote elections would be held in March 1965. A year was required to count and register the voting population, and so what was up until then the most comprehensive population survey was carried out. The Government also carried out its own information campaign to explain to the people the new electoral system. True to form the BDP cooperated wholeheartedly in the exercise. Ever suspicious, Matante's BPP charged that the registration process was being rigged. This resulted in Maruping being convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment under a section of the penal code making it an offence to make false accusations against registrations officers. (70)

With elections approaching, the campaigns of the parties stood in sharp contrast. The BDP was well prepared by election day with candidates and organized supporters in every one of the thirty-one constituencies. The other parties struggled to nominate candidates in the rural areas and in many places failed. An attempt to forge an election pact between the BPP and BIP to shore up their flagging support also came to nothing. (71)

By 1964-65 organization, rather than finance, accounted for the differences between the parties. The BPP (Matante), BDP, and BIP each had sources of internal and external support, with the first two at least being relatively well-financed in the months leading up to the election. Executive members of each of the parties travelled widely, their itineraries being suggestive. Seretse visited the United States, Europe, and countries throughout Africa. Matante and Mpho visited Socialist countries in Europe and Asia, as well as many African states. (72)

In the final weeks of the campaign, political activity was concentrated in the southeast, which appeared to contain the most marginal constituencies. The BDP was unassailable in Gammangwato, the BPP strong in the Northeast, with the BIP hopeful (but neglectful) in Ngamiland. Government officials, who watched the contest with interest, predicted that the BDP would take all but seven seats. (73)

When the results did come in, the BDP won by a landslide. They captured twenty-eight seats, with the remaining three going to Matante's BPP. The BIP was shut out, while Motsete lost his deposit running in Lobatse. Of the approximately 140,000 voters, some 80% cast their ballots for Domkrag, 14% for Matante's BPP, and slightly less than 5% for BIP.

The emergence of the National Front (BNF)

The aftermath of the election saw the birth of the last major political movement to come out of the colonial era- the BNF. In early 1965, Kenneth Koma finally returned from Moscow, via Beijing and Dar-es-Salaam, having been away for a decade and a half. He arrived just in time to witness the BDP's triumph. Thereafter he immediately set about the task of building a united front among the opposition parties and other disaffected elements, including such veterans Motsete and Raditladi and younger traditional leaders upset at their loss of power following the constitutional reforms. Prominent among these were Linchwe II, who provided Koma with an office, and Seepapitso (IV) Gaseitsiwe, then heir to his father Bathoen II. Seepapitso had already flouted the idea of forming

his own party, the Botswana National Union, which he hoped could take part in independence negotiations. (74)

In April 1965 Koma managed to gather the various elements together for the first time. On-and-off talks continued for six months, with participants usually meeting in Mochudi under Linchwe's patronage. The Special Branch, and undoubtedly the neighbouring security services, monitored developments closely, concerned that a "now classically Communist system of first establishing an overall 'Front' Secretariat and by dint of rigging...eventually gain complete and dictatorial control over the opposition".(75) Several pamphlets began to appear in August 1965 demonising Koma and his movement.

In the end, neither Matante nor Mpho proved willing to work with either Koma or each other. But, many of their followers had joined the Front by the time of its inaugural conference in Mochudi on October 3, 1965. The first meeting was opened by Linchwe, who thereafter withdrew on the grounds that his position as a member of the House of Chiefs barred him from active participation in partisan politics. Linchwe's friend Ray Molomo was nominated as party president but similarly turned down the post due to his status as a civil servant. Among those who did join were Keitseng and Motshidisi of the BIP, almost the entire Molepolole branch of the BPP, Ikalanga champion Daniel Kwele and Seretse Khama's royal uncle Serogola Seretse. Koma exercised leadership as the Fronts secretary, publicist, and organizer.

Conclusion

In 1956 Botswana had no active, internal political parties. A decade later, with the restoration of independence, it had given birth to four political parties and an electoral pattern that would define its political culture for the next quarter century. Notwithstanding the great changes which would occur within the postcolonial political economy, the BDP would prove to be resilient in maintaining power through its continued appeal in the rural areas, most especially its strongholds of Gammangwato and Kweneng. The opposition parties BPP, BIP, and BNF would also prove to be resilient challenging the BDP, while maintaining their local strongholds, in Ngamiland, the Northeast, Kgatleng, and, after 1969, Gangwaketse.

The appearance of the parties was an outgrowth and evolution of Tswana political culture towards a national consciousness defined in part by the long struggle to prevent the incorporation of the Protectorate into neighbouring settler states. In this respect, all four parties can be said to

have been truly nationalist in their conception. Each was committed to the creation of a central government led by a democratically legitimised educated elite. That this vision came to be shared by the colonial state facilitated its realization.

NOTES

[Special thanks Neil Parsons and Barry Morton for sharing their notes and insights in the preparation of this chapter.]

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2. BNA Div. Comm. North 9/3 District Intelligence Report (DIR) February-March 1960.

3. BNA Div Comm North 9/2-4 Northern Division Intelligence Committee (NDIC)/DIR.

4. BNA Div Comm North 9/3 DIR October 1959, May 1960, September 1960, December 1961; 9/4 NDIC September 1957.

5. BNA S353/6 contains Motsete and Mpho's draft BPP constitution of December 9, 1960. OP H.75/1 II, "Bechuanaland People's Party", May 11, 1960-September 29, 1961 contains additional details about the party's formation and early activities. Further information about "Political Activities B.P.P.", October 9, 1961- May 5, 1962, in H.75/1 III & IV. Div. Comm. North 9/3.

6. M. K. Mpho interviewed by B. Morton, on 10 March 1993 and W. Henderson, on 17 July 1984.

7. BNA OP H.75/1 II: Resident Commissioner (RC) to High Commissioner (HC), April 19, 1961.

8. BNA OP H.75/1 II: Chief of Police (CP) to Government Secretary (GS), March 23, 1961, enclosing the letter dated March 4, 1961.

9. BNA OP H.75/1 II: CP to GS, March 15, 1961; GS to HC, March 20, 1961; RC to HC, March 27, 1961; GS to HC, April 4, 1961. M. K. Mpho interviewed by B. Morton, 10 March 1993.

10. BNA OP H.75/VI "Political Activities B.P.P.", August 11- November 26, 1962: "Known Financial Aid for BPP from External Sources: June 1961 To Date", Special Branch, Mafeking. Also, OP H.75/1 I-IV. Div. Comm. North 9/3.

11. Seretse's position detailed in N. Parsons, W. Henderson & T. Tlou *Seretse Khama, 1921-1980*, MacMillan/Botswana Society, 1995, 182-202.

12. BNA Div. Comm. North 9/4 NDIC December 1961.

13. Tshekedi Khama Papers (TKP), file 84, KIIIMM, M.K. Mpho to Chief Seretse Khama, 10 September 1959.

14. Parsons, Henderson & Tlou *Seretse Khama*, 189.

15. Sir Peter Fawcus, interviewed 9-10 October 1986 by F. Morton, A. Murray, Q. Parsons, and J. Ramsay.

16. Sir Ketumile Masire, interviewed by B. Morton and J. Ramsay 25, March 1994.

17. U.S.A. National Archives, Washington D.C., RG 59 General Records of the State Department- Chronological file G. Mennon Williams 1961-66: Reports on August 1961 tour of Southern Africa. Sir Peter Fawcus, interviewed on 9-10 October 1986 by F. Morton, A. Murray, Q. Parsons, and J. Ramsay.

18. U.S.A. National Archives, Washington D.C., RG 59 General Records of the State Department- Chronological file G. Mennon Williams 1961-66: Telegram 21 August 1961 Williams to Secretary of State.

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20. BNA Div Comm South 3/3 GS to RC, 6 January 1962.

21. Archelaus Tsoebebe, interviewed by Q. Parsons on 26 April 1986; Sir Ketumile Masire interviewed by B. Morton & J. Ramsay, on 15 July 1993 & 25 March 1994; Nwako interviewed on 16 July 1993. C. Olsen *Shaping the Destiny of a Nation*, Gaborone: BDP, 1981.

22. Parsons, Henderson & Tlou *Seretse Khama*, 196.

23. *New Age*, December 1961.

24. BNA Div. Comm. North NDIC December 1961. M.L.A Kgasa speaking on L.D. Raditlhadi at U.B. Dept. of History Conference on Bangwato Politics under Colonial Rule, November 1984

25. BNA Div. Comm. North NDIC December 1961. Olsen Shaping the Destiny…, 9. Masire believes that Mmusi gave in to pressure from Bathoen II.

26. Div. Comm. North NDIC December 1961. S.G. Masimega, interviewed by J. Ramsay 26 March 1986.

27. Sir Ketumile Masire, interviewed by B. Morton and J. Ramsay, 25 March 1994.

28. Olsen *Shaping the Destiny of a Nation…*, 13.

29. Joe Seboni, interviewed by B. Morton on 16 July 1993.

30. Parsons, Henderson & Tlou *Seretse Khama*, 222. Sir Peter Fawcus, interviewed by F. Morton, A. Murray, Q. Parsons, and J. Ramsay, 9-10 October 1986.

31. M.K. Mpho, interviewed by B. Morton, 10 March 1993.

32. BNA OP H.75/1 V "Political Activities B.P.P.", May 15,- August 9, 1962: "B.P. Party Split. An Appreciation", Special Branch, Mafeking, July 19, 1962.

33. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "B.P. Party Split."; Divisional Special branch Office (DSBO) Lobatse to Officer in Charge, Special Branch (OCSB), June 14, 1962. Reports in *Rand Daily Mail*.

34. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "B.P. Party Split."

35. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "B.P. Party Split."; DSBO to OCSB, July 2, 1962.

36. BNA OP H.75/1 V: CP to Assistant Attorney General, July 20, 1962, containing police docket with Mlonyeni's sworn statement of June 28, 1962; CP to GS, July 20, 1962, response to a question raised by Hon. Mr.

Tsoebebe of the Legislative Council; other references throughout the file. *Naledi ya Batswana*, July 14, 1962.

37. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "B.P. PARTY SPLIT."; DSBO to OCSB, July 2, 1962.

38. BNA OP H.75/1 V: DSBO to OCSB, July 2, 1962; Report by Special Branch Operator (SBO) Mophuting, July 2, 1962.

39. BNA OP H.75/1 V: Report by SBO Mophuting, July 2, 1962.

40. BNA OP H.75/1 V: Report by SBO Mophuting, July 2, 1962.

41. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "Speech by Philip Matante at Peleng on 1.7.62."

42. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "Motsete and Matante: Break Up The Bechuanaland People's Party, The Statement Issued By Five Members Of The National Executive...", July 1, 1962.

43. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: CP to GS, August 7, 1962.

44. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "The B.P. Party Split."; O.K. Menyatso, H.O.L. Morolong, Kefentse, and B. Dipatane to K.T. Motsete, July 9, 1962; R. Noke, B. Engleton, K.M. Makwati, R.K. Nwako, B. Sebokonyane, R. Mokongwa, and M. Matsime, to K.T. Motsete, undated. H.75/VI: "Operation Weekend Jaunt", OCSB to GS, August 20, 1962; "Bechuanaland People's Party August-1962", Central Intelligence Committee (CIC) Report.

45. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: "Ban on BPP Meetings", DC Serowe to GS, October 19, 1962.

46. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "Speech by Brown Mmelesi at Peleng on 29.7.62."

47. M.K. Mpho, interviewed by B. Morton, 10 March 1993.

48. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "B.P. Party Split."

49. BNA OP H.75/1 V: "B.P. Party Split."

50. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: "Known Financial Aid for BPP from External Sources: June 1961 to Date".

51. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: "Consolidated Note on intended B.P. Party demonstrations/meetings at Lobatsi...", OCSB to CP, August 14, 1962; OCSB to CP, August 15, 1962; RC to HC, August 16, 1962; CIC Report "Bechuanaland People's Party August-1962.

52. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: "Consolidated Note on intended B.P. Party demonstrations/meetings at Lobatsi...", OCSB to CP, August 14, 1962; RC to HC, August 16, 1962; CIC Report "Bechuanaland People's Party August-1962.

53. It was subsequently postponed to August 30, 1962, when Matante was cleared of criminal charges- BNA OP H.75/1 VI.

54. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: Britinform, Mafeking to Britinform, Johannesburg, August 23, 1962; "B.P. Party Mid-week Jaunt", August 25, 1962; CIC Report "Bechuanaland Peoples Party August-1962"; Office of Divisional Superintendent, Francistown to CP, August 23, 1962; CP to GS, Sept. 3, 1962.

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56. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: "*Pego Ya Phutego Ya Tshognetso Ya Legotla-La-Sechaba* (BPP)..."

57. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: Peter Marupeng, Secretary-General BPP, to Secretary-General United Nations, August 20, 1962.

58. B. Egner, interviewed by Parsons 19 February 1987, 15 & 27 October 1990; 23 August 1993. B. Morton "Fish Keitseng-Man of the People" *Botswana Gazette*, 29 September 1993 based on interview with Keitseng, 11 April 1993. In his autobiography, Nelson Mandela is silent about the British connection.

59. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: OCSB to CP, August 14, 1962; OCSB to CP, August 15, 1962; RC to HC, August 16, 1962; OCSB to CP, August 15, 1962; OCSB to CP, August 28, 1962. Fish Keitseng, interviewed by B. Morton, 11 September 1993. N. Mandela *Long Walk to Freedom,* 1995, 360-65.

60. Emma Gilbey *The Lady: The Life and Times of Winnie Mandela*, London: Jonathan Cape 1993, 304-5 citing *The National Reporter* vol. 10 no.2, 1986. *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, July 4, 1990.

61. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: OCSB to CP, August 15, 1962; OCSB to CP, August 28, 1962. Div. Comm. North 9/3, NDIC minutes note the existence of South African Police in Ghanzi, Palapye, and Serowe in 1961.

62. Parsons, Henderson & Tlou Seretse Khama, 202.

63. BNA OP H.75/1 VI: DSBO to OCSB, November 3, 1962. Earlier in the year, Mandela had spent an afternoon with Motsete in Lobatse.

64. BNA OP H. 75/1 VI: K.T. Motsete to GS, November 3, 1962.

65. BNA OP H 75 DC Machaneng to Act RC & NDIC, 8 August 1963; TS 2/12/I.

66. Masire, interviewed by B. Morton & J. Ramsay 15 July 1993.

67. *Therisanyo* vol 2 no. 2-3 February, March 1964.

68. B. Morton & J. Ramsay *Making of a President, Sir Ketumile Masire's Early Years*, Pula Press 1996, chapter 7.

69. BNA OP H 301/2 SB reports November 1993; H 75/1 A.

70. OP 6/2 I; 523/1 I.

71. M.K. Mpho interview by B. Morton, 10 March 1993.

72. Trips by BDP members were documented in *Bechuanaland Daily News* and *Kultwano,* as well as *Therisanyo* during the period. BPP/BIP in H 75 (Political Activities) & 23/2 (CIC) series files for the period. H. Robertson "From Protectorate to Republic", chapter 6. In its election analysis the *Soviet Africa Review*, April 1965, described the BIP as the "most progressive" movement.

73. BNA OP 523/1/I

74. Formation of BNF: BNA OP 5/15/8/I; 5/15/4 I; SP 31/2/I; SP 31/3/I

75. BNA SP 31/6 Memo W.S. Grant, Head of Special Branch, 16 August 1967.